McWatters stated:
"Some in the credit union community contend a 1.30 percent normal operating level has historically been sufficient to address risks to the Share Insurance Fund, including during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. This is simply not true. The very existence of the Stabilization Fund and the fact the NCUA borrowed $5.1 billion from the U.S. Treasury to fund resolution obligations, demonstrates that the credit union community was not prepared to handle the impact of the large losses that resulted from the failure of five federally insured corporate credit unions as a result of the 2007–2009 recession.Hopefully, McWatters' statement puts to rest the false narrative being pushed by certain credit unions and their trade associations that the equity ratio of 1.30 percent for the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund was adequate.
These corporate credit unions were not some wholly separate and anomalous externality. They were insured credit unions created, funded, and governed by natural-person credit unions. As noted previously, without the Stabilization Fund, all of the equity in the Insurance Fund would have been consumed by these losses.
The corporate system is better regulated now, and much smaller than it used to be. Therefore, the exposure to future losses from corporate credit unions should be significantly reduced. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the Insurance Fund was imperiled by the risk exposure of this portion of the credit union community.
Others contend that the credit union community weathered the financial crisis just fine with the caveat “if you don’t include the corporate credit union losses.” This contention also is not consistent with established historical fact. The number of troubled credit unions, including large institutions, increased materially during the Great Recession. The Share Insurance Fund’s equity ratio fell below 1.20 percent even without the corporate credit union losses. Meaning, the equity ratio fell below 1.20 percent only because of natural-person credit union losses and insured share growth.
The result was two Share Insurance Fund premiums totaling 22.7 basis points or $1.66 billion. The actual decline in the equity ratio from the 2007–2009 severe recession was predominantly the result of the increase in loss reserves for natural-person credit unions, as required under accounting standards applicable to the Insurance Fund and, to a lesser extent, elevated insured share growth. Realized Share Insurance Fund losses were significantly elevated as well. From 2008–2012, 112 natural-person credit unions failed at a cost of $807 million to the Insurance Fund.
Clearly, a 1.30 percent normal operating level for the Share Insurance Fund was not adequate to handle the 2007–2009 severe recession."
Mcwatters apparently does not know the taxi loan story.
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